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Abstract
1 
This paper revisits the effects of a country’s institutional framework on individual 
firms’ behavior, in particular focusing on their propensity to comply with legal 
rules. The theoretical model presented here suggests that these effects may be of 
paramount significance—contrary to the recently popularized paradigm arguing 
that differences across countries have ceased to matter much. This paper’s 
empirical strategy consists of explaining the variation in measures of non-
compliance with legal rules and employs a rich dataset based on thousands of 
firms from dozens of countries. We find that most of the variation emanates from 
country-wide differences in institutional quality, although some firm 
characteristics play a role as well. Our conclusion is that countries still matter in 
providing institutional infrastructure, which determines to a large extent the 
context within which firms operate. 
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Key Words: Firms, Institutions, Law compliance, Country differences, 
Globalization 
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1. Introduction 
 
The image of the flat world used by Thomas Friedman in his bestselling book (2006) is just one 
of the many metaphors used to describe the effect of globalization on lowering country barriers. 
Indeed, the argument that globalization destroys differences across countries and makes them 
similar economically, socially, and culturally has become exceedingly popular in recent years 
(see Leamer, 2006, for a pointed criticism and further literature references). Homogenization of 
the world economy—to the extent that it has happened—may, in turn, have substantial economic 
effects on trade as well as on the growth of national incomes and their distribution. 
This paper takes this argument seriously and seeks to validate it empirically. To do so, 
the scope of the inquiry must first be defined. We focus on the compliance with legal rules, 
primarily for two reasons. The substantive one has to do with the apparent importance of 
institutions such as the rule of law and legal enforcement for economic performance. This has 
been emphasized forcefully by De Soto (1989, 2000) and is substantiated statistically in the 
emerging literature (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005, for a review). Another reason 
is that our data, further detailed below, seem to be especially well suited to deal with this set of 
issues. In particular, the data contain proxies for law compliance by thousands of business firms 
from a wide range of countries that display large institutional variation. Although survey based, 
these data are invaluable because internationally comparable measures of compliance are hard to 
come by.  
While the data contain information on several aspects of law compliance, such as the 
scope of corruption, bribery, and the extent of informality—by which we mean the propensity of 
firms to hide output—the main analysis focuses on the latter. In particular, the theoretical 
argument is that, in countries with weak legal enforcement, firms will tend to hide a higher share 
of their economic activity in order to save on the costs of complying with regulatory 
requirements. In contrast, where legal enforcement is strong, firms will tend to be formal, 
preferring to incur the costs of regulation rather than face the penalty of avoiding them. 
The empirical analysis benefits from the availability of the rich firm-level data on the 
extent of informality across a wide range of countries—developed, developing, and in 
transition—covering a wide spectrum of qualities pertaining to legal institutions and 
enforcement. The null hypothesis—consistent with the “flat world” paradigm—is that most of 
the variation in informality is driven by firm-level characteristics, whereas the significance of   5
country-level characteristics—in particular, a country’s institutional quality—should be 
marginal. The analysis reveals that many of the available firm-level characteristics are indeed 
relevant for explaining the variation in informality. For example, firm size matters; smaller firms 
appear to be hiding a larger share of output, while exporting firms and those with foreign 
ownership appear to be hiding less. Yet, there is strong evidence that most of the variation is 
driven by differences across countries in their respective levels of institutional quality, thus 
rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of what is implied by our theoretical model. In particular, 
commonly used measures of institutional strength emerge as the most statistically significant 
variables. 
We further use the same methodology to explain the variation in other proxies for non-
compliance with the rule of law, such as corruption and bribery. Generally, the results are similar 
to—and often even stronger than—those obtained for informality: while firm characteristics 
matter, most of the relevant variation is explained by country-wide measures for institutional 
strength, and less so by firm-specific characteristics. 
This paper is related to recent work that examines the effects of countries’ legal 
institutions on various outcomes (see Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002), and more generally, to work 
that emphasizes the role of institutional quality in development (see Acemoglu et al., 2005, for a 
review). In particular, many of the recent papers in this tradition convincingly argue for the 
importance of institutional quality in achieving fast growth (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
Additional important recent efforts in this regard have been directed toward international trade. 
Thus, Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) show 
that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of trade flows; the latter paper also 
draws growth implications from this inference. Examining yet another aspect, Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stultz (2004) argue that country-wide variation in institutional quality is responsible for the 
bulk of variation in corporate governance across business firms. In work that is more specifically 
related to the current endeavor, Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, and Inchauste (2006) and Friedman et 
al. (2000) find that institutional quality is an important determinant of informality; these works 
do not, however, distinguish between firm-level and country-level characteristics, and ignore 
other aspects of illegality such as corruption, which is studied here. Finally, Fisman and Miguel, 
2006, examine an aspect of illegal behavior of international diplomats stationed in New York 
City and find that it is correlated with their respective countries’ corruption indicators. While the   6
authors do not distinguish between individual- and county-level characteristics—and their 
sample cannot be considered as representative—the flavor of their results is consistent with ours. 
This is especially gratifying because their evidence, being based on objective data, should be 
viewed as complementary to this paper’s findings. 
The remainder of the presentation is organized as follows. The next section contains a 
simple analytical model. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical approach, followed by 
the actual empirical analysis in Section 4. Section 5 then concludes with brief remarks. 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1. The Model 
We employ Becker’s 1968 approach to illegal behavior, embedding it in a context that is more 
closely related to our empirical analysis. There is a continuum of firms in the economy. Firms 
use capital as an input, and their production function is standard: 
y = f(k), f’ > 0, f” <   0          ( 1 )  
Letting r denote the interest rate and normalizing the output price to unity, the operating 
profits are: 
P
 = f(k) – rk            ( 2 )  
where it is assumed that the interest rate is set in international capital markets, hence is given. 
Considering a closed economy, the ensuing equilibrium determination of the interest rate would 
unduly complicate the model without providing additional insights into the specific set of issues 
of interest here. We assume that operating formally is costly. Complying with regulation and 
licensing is one important element of such costs. Further, these costs are generally not uniform, 
but differ across sectors and industries; and they may also depend on the firm’s idiosyncratic 
characteristics, whereby some firms may find it easier to operate formally than others. Thus, let 
ni denote the share of profits that a firm generates in the informal sector, and 1- ni the share of 
profits in the informal sector; ci denotes the cost per unit of such profits associated with 
operating formally. The share of net profits in the formal sector is then given as follows: 
Πi
F = [f(k) – rk - ci](1- ni)         ( 3 )    7
The share of profits generated informally, ni, saves the regulation compliance costs, but is 
potentially subject to penalty. Thus, we assume that the firms are subject to auditing, which 
results in uncovering informality with the probability p(ni) that increases in the share of informal 
activity, p’ > 0, p(0) = 0, p(1) < 1. If the firm chooses to operate informally, it avoids the direct 
cost of regulatory requirements but faces a likelihood of being caught and fined. The probability 
of being caught when operating informally hinges on the quality of the legal system and is 
considered a national public good. In contrast, weak institutional quality implies lax 
enforcement, either because of incompetence or because of associated bribery and corruption of 
public officials.
2 We suppose that, when caught, the firm is fined by the full amount of its 
profits.
3 While p can be more fully endogenized (in fact, the literature on tax evasion and optimal 
auditing deals precisely with this issue; see Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, for a classic paper), 
here it is assumed to be exogenously given. These assumptions imply that the expected share of 
profits in the informal sector is given as follows: 
Πi
N = [f(k) – rk] ni [1-p(ni) ]         ( 4 )  




N = [P(k) - ci](1- ni) + P(k) ni [1-p(ni)] =  
[f(k) – rk - ci](1- ni) + [f(k) – rk] ni [1-p(ni)]      (5) 
The firms determine the share of their informal activity as well as the amount of 
employed capital.  
2.2 Analysis and Implications 
Profit maximization implies that at the internal solution: 
f'(k) – r  =   0            ( 6 )  
which determines the amount of capital employed, k*. Maximizing (5) with respect to ni and 
assuming an internal solution we then obtain the first order condition: 
                                                           
2 A broader interpretation is that weak institutional quality manifests itself in the inability of informal entrepreneurs 
to secure property rights, access credit markets, and have recourse to the legal system. 
3 This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity; nothing substantial changes when the fine is fixed at a different 
rate.     8
[P(k*) - ci] + P(k*) [1-p(ni) + n i (1-p’(ni))] = ci + P(k*)[-p(ni) + ni (1-p’(ni))] = 0   (7) 
where P(k*) = f(k*) – rk*. To simplify the comparative statics exercise, suppose that the 
probability of informality detection in case of auditing is proportional to the extent of 
informality: 
p(ni) = γni, ½ < γ <   1           ( 8 )  
The parameter γ  is interpreted as the level of institutional quality, and—being generated 
at a national level—is country specific. An obviously important question, from which this paper 
extrapolates, is what determines γ, but because we are instead interested in its effects on firms’ 
behavior, it is assumed to be exogenously given here.   
Then (7) is rewritten as follows: 
ci + P(k*)[-γni + (1-γ)ni]   =   0          ( 7 ’ )  
and 
ni = ci / (2γP ( k * ) )           ( 9 )  
Differentiation of (9) leads then to the following: 
Proposition 1. The share of informal activity conducted by a firm increases in terms of 
the regulatory cost and is inversely related to the institutional quality as captured by the 
strength of legal monitoring and enforcement. Further, the effect of regulatory costs on 
informality is reduced in the presence of strong enforcement. 
 
The variation of informality across the firms—as captured by the standard deviation, for 
example—is calculated from (9): 
σ n = σ c / (2γP ( k * ) )          ( 1 0 )  
Further analysis of (10) then leads to the following results:   
Proposition 2. The variation in informality across the firms is positively related to the 
variation in regulatory costs they face and is negatively related to institutional strength. 
More importantly, the higher the level of institutional quality, the smaller the effect of 
increased variability in regulatory costs on the variability in informality. 
   9
The implication of these results is that a county’s institutional environment is a 
significant determinant of informality, in addition to industry-specific or even firm-specific 
characteristics. Further, the importance of the latter is diminished in the context of a strong 
institutional setup. 
2.3. An Extension 
We now extend the model by adding an element of firms’ heterogeneity. Specifically, we assume 




 [f(k) – rk]          ( 2 ’ )  
where ai
 is interpreted as the know-how, the skill level of the workers and the management, or 
more generally, as any capital productivity-enhancing endowment. The profit function is then as 
in (5) with (2’) replacing P there.   
Maximization with respect to the amount of capital yields: 
ai
 f(k) – r  =   0           ( 1 1 )  
which determines the optimal amount of capital, ki
*. Clearly, as revealed by differentiating (11), 





*] denote the level of operating profits when the firm’s optimal amount of capital is employed. 
The envelope theorem implies that these profits increase with ai so that more productive firms 
are more profitable. 
Profit maximization with respect to the level of informal activity yields—after some 
manipulations available on request—the following:  
ni = c i / (2γ Pi
*)         ( 9 ’ )  
An analysis of (9’) reveals that there is an inverse relationship between a firm’s size—as 
optimally determined by its productivity—and the level of informal activity in which it engages. 
Further, this is mediated through the level of legal enforcement: when it is weak, the relationship 
between firm size and informality is more pronounced than when it is strong.  
To summarize,   10
Proposition 3. There is an inverse relationship between firm size and informality, so that 
bigger firms are less engaged in the informal sector than smaller firms. Also, this 
relationship is more pronounced under weak institutions. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Data and Basic Statistics  
We use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data available at the World Bank 
website.
4 The survey was taken as an initiative of the World Bank Group, in partnership with 
many other institutions seeking to gather feedback from enterprises on the state of the private 
sector in client countries; to measure the quality of governance and public services, including the 
extent of corruption; to provide better information on constraints to private-sector growth from 
the enterprise perspective; to establish the basis for internationally comparable indicators that can 
track changes in the business environment over time, thus allowing both for competitive 
assessment and impact assessments of market-oriented reforms; and to stimulate systematic 
public-private dialogue on business perceptions and the agenda for reform. The field work was 
done between 1999 and 2000 by private polling of firms in each country that fulfilled the 
project’s basic requirements. The survey was targeted to a representative sample of firms filling 
criteria such as sector, size, location, and ownership characteristics.
5 The objective was to gather 
information on a sizeable number of firms in several countries around the world, which was 
accomplished for most of the sample.
6 
The sample consists of the firm-level survey responses of thousands of firms in more than 
80 countries, many of them developing and in transition. The survey asked each business to rank 
the constraints or problems impacting on their operations. This process involved an extensive 
                                                           
4 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/. 
5 The particular requirements were selected as follows. Sector: in each country, the sectoral composition in terms of 
manufacturing (including agro-processing) versus services (including commerce) will be determined by relative 
contribution to GDP, subject to a 15 percent minimum for each category. Size: at least 15 percent of the sample shall 
be in the small size categories and 15 percent in the large size categories. Ownership: at least 15 percent of the firms 
will have foreign control. Exporters: at least 15 percent of firms will be exporters, meaning that some significant 
share of their output is exported. Location: at least 15 percent of firms will be in the category “small city or 
countryside.” 
6 The countries and number of firms (in parenthesis) included in the survey are: Argentina (76), Bangladesh (38), 
Belarus (101), Bolivia (72), Brazil (148), Bulgaria (84), Canada (87), Chile (80), Colombia (88), Costa Rica (51), 
Czech Republic (81), Dominican Republic (68), Ecuador (52), El Salvador (63), France (72), Germany (75), 
Guatemala (51), Haiti (71), Honduras (50), Hungary (102), India (123), Indonesia (70), Italy (67), Malaysia (43), 
Mexico (43), Nicaragua (62), Pakistan (72), Panama (49), Peru (77), Philippines (90), Poland (175) , Portugal (78), 
Romania (114), Slovakia (23), Spain (82), Sweden (76), Thailand (71), Turkey (113), United Kingdom (59), United 
States (86), Ukraine (158), and Uruguay (57).   11
questionnaire undertaken via a face-to-face interview with either the managers or owners of each 
company. As a result, the survey reports comparative measurements based on firms’ perceptions 
about the investment climate as shaped by economic policy; governance and corruption; 
regulation and taxes; infrastructure; public service quality; predictability of economic 
developments and policies; financial constraints; the survey additionally provides measurements 
based on firm size, growth, and other characteristics.  
More importantly for our analyses, the survey has information about aspects of firms’ 
environment and modus operandi. One major question is related to the extent of informal 
activities. Specifically, the latter can be retrieved from answers to the following question: 
“Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and 
regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of 
activity keeps ‘off the books’?” The responses are reported as follows: j=1 if none at all; j=2 if 1-
10 percent; j=3 if 11-20 percent; j=4 if 21-30 percent; j=5 if 31-40 percent; j=6 if 41-50 percent; 
and j=7 if more than 50 percent. 
Arguably, this variable is only a rough proxy for informality for two reasons. First, all the 
firms in the survey are registered firms, which implies that they all operate in the formal 
economy, but many of them hide at least some output. Therefore, we are ignoring firms that are 
completely unregistered, particularly small enterprises, and are omitting a potentially important 
part of the economy in developing countries (see de Soto, 1989). This omission would likely bias 
our estimates of hidden activity downward for economies where there is a greater incidence of 
informality. Second, the question is phrased in terms of typical behavior of firms in that sector, 
rather than in terms of the behavior of the firm in question, which may introduce a bias toward 
the average behavior of other firms in that environment. 
For robustness purposes, we also use additional indicators of illegality provided through 
information on the frequency of bribery payments made to government agencies for procurement 
of contracts or regular services. The survey includes a number of questions in this regard; a 
typical one is: “Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials to gain government contracts?” The responses are reported as follows: 1=Never; 2= 
Seldom; 3= Sometimes; 4= Frequently; 5= Mostly; 6= Always. 
The survey also contains a breakdown of firms by size as measured by the number of 
employees. Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium-sized firms employ between 51 and   12
500 employees, and large firms employ more than 500 employees. We construct two dummy 
variables for large and medium and interpret our results in relation to small-sized firms. As other 
firm-level controls, we use indicators of firm ownership (foreign, government), if the firm 
exports, and firms’ age. We control for industry effects by including dummy variables for 
manufacturing, services, construction, agriculture, and services.
7 
In order to address the question of whether the firms’ behavior and the impact of the 
various firm-level obstacles vary based on the national proxies of institutional development, we 
complement the firm-level data with cross-country-level indicators from various sources. Our 
theoretical framework implies that a poor legal environment creates incentives for firms to 
operate informally. We use a measure for the efficiency of the legislative and the well-known 
International Country Risk Guide Index (ICRG, 2006) as a proxy for the quality of institutions 
and the level of legal enforcement in a country, respectively. As a robustness check, we also use 
alternative measures of institutional quality, in particular, the governance measures developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). 
 
Table 1. Variables Definition 
Variable    Source 
Firm behavior   
% of sales off the books   Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and
regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical firm in your
area of activity keeps “off the books”: (1) none; (2) 1-10%; (3) 11-20%; (4) 21-30%; (5) 
31-40%; (6) 41-50%; (7) over 50%. 
% of contract value paid to 
government 
When firms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the contract
value must they offer in additional or unofficial payments to secure the contract? 1=up to
1%; 2=1-5%; 3=6-10%; 4=11-15%; 5=16-20%; 6=Greater than 20%.  
Corruption-frequency of 
payments to telephone 
authorities 
Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials
to get connected to telephone? 1=Never; 2= Seldom; 3= Sometimes; 4= Frequently; 5= 
Mostly; 6= Always. 
Corruption-frequency of 
payments to licensing 
authorities 
Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials
to get licenses and permits? 1=Never; 2= Seldom; 3= Sometimes; 4= Frequently; 5= 
Mostly; 6= Always. 
Corruption-frequency of 
payments to tax authorities 
Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials
to deal with tax and tax collection? 1=Never; 2= Seldom; 3= Sometimes; 4= Frequently; 
5= Mostly; 6= Always. 
Corruption-frequency of 
payments to gain government 
contracts 
Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials
to gain government contracts? 1=Never; 2= Seldom; 3= Sometimes; 4= Frequently; 5= 
Mostly; 6= Always. 
Corruption-frequency of 
payments to customs  
authorities  
Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials
when dealing with customs/imports? 1=Never; 2= Seldom; 3= Sometimes; 4= 





                                                           
7 It should be noted that the WBES survey only covers firms already in existence, so we cannot infer anything about 
the relative importance of these obstacles for potential entrepreneurs who are considering the decision to be formal 
versus informal.   13
Table 1., continued 
    
Variable    Source 
Firms' characteristics   
Company is owned by a foreign 
investor 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the company is owned by a foreign investor,
0 otherwise. 
Government owns the company Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if any government agency or state body has a
financial stake in the ownership of the firm, 0 otherwise. 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if firm is in the manufacturing industry, 0 
otherwise. 
Service  Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if firm is in the service industry, 0 otherwise. 
Agriculture  Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if firm is in the agricultural industry, 0
otherwise. 




A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees, medium size if it has
between 51 and 500 employees and large if it has more than 500 employees. 
Years since the company was 
established 
Difference between the year in which the interview was taken and the year in which the
firm was established. 
 
Macroeconomic context   
Log(GDP)  Logarithm of the average GDP for the period 1995-1999. Expressed in Constant 2000 
U.S. dollars. 




Labor regulations obstacle  Country-level average of the answers to the question: Judge on a four-point scale how 
problematic are the labor regulations for the operation and growth of your business:
1=No obstacle; 2=Minor obstacle; 3=Moderate Obstacle; 4=Major obstacle. 
WBES 
Inflation rate  Average rate of inflation of the consumers price index for the period 1995-1999.   
Effectiveness  of  the  legislature   Index of the effectiveness of the legislature. Ascending scale from 1 to 4 (1=no
legislature; 2=largely ineffective; 3=partly effective; 4=effective;). Average of the years
1945 through 1998. 
Botero et al. (2004). 
Institutional variables     
ICRG index  Aggregate index for institutional risk. This index combines information on corruption,
rule of law, and bureaucratic quality. Higher values of this index indicate lower risks. We
use mean values of this index for the year 1998. 
Corruption  Index on risks implied by corruption. Higher values of this index indicate lower risks. 
We use mean values of this index for the year 1998. 
Rule of law (ICRG)  Index on risk implied by the rule of law in each country. Higher values of this index 
indicate lower risks. We use mean values of this index for the year 1998. 
ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) 
Political stability and absence 
of violence 
Synthetic index that combines several indicators that measure perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This
index captures the idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the 
likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the
continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to
peacefully select and replace those in power. Higher values of the index indicate more 
political stability and absence of violence. We use the average value of this index for the
year 2000. 
Government effectiveness   Synthetic  index  that  combines responses regarding the quality of public service 
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” 
required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and 
deliver public goods. Higher values of the index mean a more effective government. We
use the average value of this index for the year 2000. 
Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2005)
   14
Table 1., continued 
Variable    Source 
Rule of law (WB)  Synthetic index that includes several indicators measuring the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in
developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for
economic and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are 
protected. Higher indicator denotes a higher quality rule of law. We use the average
value of this index for the year 2000. 
Control of corruption  Synthetic index that measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the 
exercise of public power for private gain. Despite this straightforward focus, the
particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat,
ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of 
corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political
arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture.” The presence of
corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect by both the corrupter (typically a 
private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a public official or politician) for the
rules that govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance 
according to our definition. Higher values of the index mean a higher control of 
corruption. We use the average value of this index for the year 2000. 
 
 
We merged the firm-level data obtained through the WBES with country-level control 
variables such as GDP per capita, growth rate, and the inflation rate, which were taken from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005). These variables were used as five-year 
averages in order to avoid capturing some noise due to the natural volatility of macroeconomic 
variables. We use the ICRG index for the year 1998—the same year the WBES was conducted. 
Additionally, we also include the average unemployment rate for the whole decade in order to 
capture the effects of the labor-market situation on the degree to which firms adopt irregular 
behavior. Finally, we take into account the efficiency of the legislature as a proxy for 
enforcement (Botero et al., 2004). 
Table 1 contains a listing of all the main variables used, Table 2 provides some basic 
descriptive statistics, and Table 3 presents a correlation matrix. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Firm behavior       
% of sales off the books  3567 2.910 2.143  1  7 
% of contract value paid to government  1711 2.568 1.803  1  6 
Corruption-frequency of payments to telephone authorities  1347 2.239 1.688  1  6 
Corruption-frequency of payments to licensing authorities  1447 2.718 1.793  1  6 
Corruption-frequency of payments to tax authorities  1437 2.397 1.742  1  6 
Corruption-frequency of payments to gain government contracts  1164 2.267 1.795  1  6 
Corruption-frequency of payments to customs authorities   1201 2.273 1.732  1  6 
Firms' characteristics                
Company is owned by a foreign investor  3567 0.197 0.398  0  1 
Government owns the company  3567 0.907 0.291  0  1 
Manufacturing  3567 0.385 0.487  0  1 
Service  3567 0.475 0.499  0  1 
Agriculture  3567 0.055 0.228  0  1 
Construction  3567 0.084 0.277  0  1 
Size: Small  3567 0.348 0.476  0  1 
Size: Medium  3567 0.438 0.496  0  1 
Size: Large  3567 0.186 0.389  0  1 
Years since the company was established  3567 20.561  25.772  0  426 
Macroeconomic context       
Log(GDP)  3567 25.817  1.394 22.77 29.79 
GDP growth (%)  3567 2.516 2.297 -1.20  8.76 
Labor regulations obstacle  3567 2.372 0.468 1.68  3.46 
Inflation rate  3567 28.787  45.323 0.76 252.66 
Effectiveness of the legislature   3567 1.584 0.703 0.91  3.00 
Institutional variables                
ICRG index  3567 6.249 1.874 3.33 10.00 
Corruption  3567 3.229 1.304  1  6 
Rule of law (ICRG)  3567 4.361 1.153  2  6 
Political stability and absence of violence  3567 0.176 0.827 -1.85  1.49 
Government effectiveness   3567 0.286 0.823 -1.05  2.01 
Rule of law (WB)  3567 0.253 0.886 -0.93  1.99 
Control of corruption  3567 0.155 0.997 -1.02  2.50 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
  



























-0.116                                               Company owned by  
foreign investor  0.000                          
0.069  0.024                         Government owns 
the company 
0.000  0.164                        
Manufacturing  0.018  0.119  -0.050                      
  0.281  0.000  0.004                      
Service  -0.032  -0.032  0.073  -0.753                     
  0.064  0.064  0.000  0.000                     
Agriculture  0.000  -0.087  -0.064  -0.188  -0.241                  
  0.987  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                   
Construction  0.025  -0.075  0.021  -0.225  -0.289 -0.072                 
  0.150  0.000  0.221  0.000  0.000  0.000                  
Exporter  -0.084  0.261  -0.053  0.360  -0.252 -0.066 -0.117                
  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                
Size: Medium  -0.040 0.041 -0.100 0.058  -0.088 0.079  -0.010  0.057                
  0.018  0.017  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.560  0.001               
Size: Large  -0.089  0.240  -0.116  0.136  -0.084 -0.029 -0.059  0.236  -0.409             
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.087 0.001  0.000 0.000               
-0.124  0.122  -0.092  0.072  -0.015 -0.072 -0.041  0.165  0.023  0.274           Years since company 
was established 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.387  0.000 0.016  0.000 0.180  0.000               17
Table 3., continued 
 
  



























Log(GDP)  -0.086  0.015  0.017  -0.101  0.080  -0.019 0.057  -0.017  0.071  -0.046  0.110         
  0.000  0.375  0.323  0.000  0.000  0.261 0.001  0.314 0.000  0.007  0.000           
GDP growth (%)  -0.044 0.095 0.011 0.051  0.061  -0.196 -0.039  0.162  -0.054  0.101 0.157  0.115        
  0.010  0.000  0.530  0.003  0.000  0.000 0.022  0.000 0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000         
Labor regulations 
obstacle  -0.050  0.171  0.144  0.069  0.050  -0.222 -0.022 0.169 0.037  0.121  0.237  0.093 0.268       
  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.000 0.192  0.000 0.027  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000       
Inflation rate  0.072 -0.144 -0.161 0.021  -0.135 0.205  0.039  -0.116  0.016  -0.096 -0.164  -0.296  -0.559 -0.432     
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.228  0.000  0.000 0.022  0.000 0.363  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000     
-0.210  0.069  0.092  -0.030 0.085  -0.145 0.026  0.109 0.017  0.085  0.301  0.529 0.214 0.351  -0.311    Effectiveness of the 
legislature  
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.077  0.000  0.000 0.123  0.000 0.314  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000   
ICRG  -0.226  0.029  -0.016  -0.071 0.110  -0.119 0.013  0.109 -0.056  -0.045  0.169  0.314 0.461 0.069  -0.343  0.567 
   0.000  0.086  0.344  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.455  0.000 0.001  0.009  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
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3.2. Empirical Specification  
The basic specification we use is as follows: 
Xij = α + βF Yij + βC Zj + εij           (12) 
where Xij is the non-compliance variable for firm i in country j; Yij is a vector of firm-specific 
characteristics; Zj is a vector of country-wide characteristics; βF and βC  are vectors of firm-
specific and country-specific coefficients, respectively. In particular, the firm characteristics 
considered are whether the company is owned by a foreign investor or by the government, the 
corresponding economic sector, whether the firm exports or not, the size of the firm, and the 
number of years since the firm was established. Similarly, the country variables included are the 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the country (in logs), the GDP’s rate of growth, the rate of 
inflation, labor regulations, the effectiveness of the legislature, and our main variable of interest, 
the institutional quality of the country.
8 The significance of the coefficients βF and βC  indicates 
that the respective firm-specific and/or country-specific characteristics matter. Since we have a 
categorical dependent variable, we use ordered probit regression models.
9 We compute the 
within, between, and overall R-Squared as squared correlation coefficients between the observed 
and predicted values of our dependent variable on each level of analysis. As is known, in 
standard ordinary least square models the R-Squared is equal to the squared correlation 
coefficient between y y ˆ  and y. Due to the particular properties of the ordinary least squares 
estimator, this estimate turns out to be equal to the variance of  y ˆ  divided by the variance of y; 
the properties of the estimator also restrict the values of the R-Squared to be between 0 and 1. In 
general, however, the squared correlation is not equal to the ratio of variances, and the ratio of 
variances is not required to be less than 1. We are only able to use the former method in order to 
give a proxy of the percentage of the variance of the dependent variable explained by country or 
firm characteristics.
10  We tested a broad array of additional firm-level controls and found little 
                                                           
8 We tested a broad array of empirical specifications and found the institutional variable to be extremely robust 
among country-level variables. Similarly, at the firm level, firm size and foreign ownership are also quite robust. A 
formal test using the method by Sala-i-Martín (1997) can be provided upon request. 
9 Unsurprisingly, the results from probit regressions are very similar to those obtained using ordered probits. To save 
space we do not report these results but would be happy to provide them upon request. 
10 The reported R
2 are computed as follows:  
R-Squared overall:          ) ˆ ˆ ( ) | 1 ˆ Pr( ), | 1 ˆ Pr( * 1 β α ρ it it it it x X y where X y y + Φ = = = =    19
difference in the specific impact of our variables of interest, namely, institutions and size of firm, 
as well as the relative importance of within firms and between countries correlation with respect 
to informality and illegality; these additional results are available upon request. 
4. Results 
4.1. Informality 
We test the predictions of the model by first regressing our informality proxy on firm and 
country characteristics, as described above. With respect to firm characteristics, the effect of 
different types of ownership are considered, especially foreign and government ownership. 
Foreign-owned firms may be more respectful to domestic legislation because they tend to face 
more scrutiny, both implicitly and explicitly. By the same token, government-owned firms may 
face less strict scrutiny and such firms may thus be linked to more informality in their 
transactions. The expected sign of exporting firms appears to be less obvious. On the one hand, 
their involvement in the international marketplace may force them to be more transparent and 
thus to have fewer opportunities and incentives to behave informally, but at the same time the 
fact that they are more open gives them more opportunity to behave in a way that promotes the 
substantial expansion of their sales. We also include sector dummies for the five industries 
available in the survey, namely: services, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction, with 
firms corresponding to other industries constituting our base category. Size dummies are also 
included for medium and large firms, with small firms constituting the base category; as implied 
by our theoretical model, we expect that smaller firms—having a higher probability of being off 
the legal radar screen—are more inclined to illegality. Among the country-level control 
variables, the ICRG index, which captures the country’s institutional quality, is of primary 
interest. Following our theoretical framework, we expect a negative association between the 
institutional quality and the level of informality. Among the additional country-level controls, we 
include the GDP, which we expect to yield a negative sign, since more developed countries are 
typically linked with more legality and formality. Other basic controls included are the growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
R-Squared Between:          ) ˆ ˆ ( ) | 1 ˆ Pr( ), | 1 ˆ Pr( * 2 β α ρ i it i i x X y where X y y + Φ = = = =  
R-Squared Within:              ) ˆ ) (( ) | 1 ) ˆ ˆ Pr(( ) | 1 ˆ ~ Pr( ), | 1 ˆ ~ Pr( * ~
3 β ρ i it it it it it it x x X y y X y where X y y − Φ = = − = = = =  
Φ denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution, and ρn the correlation coefficients, which we square to have 
the final estimated assessment of the goodness of fit denoted by the R-squared.   20
rate of the economy, the rate of inflation, a labor regulation variable, and an institutional 
monitoring variable. 
 
Table 4. Country and Firm Determinants of Informality 
 
  Percentage of sales off the books  
Firm variables      
-0.267  -0.276  Company is owned by a foreign investor 
(4.18)***  (3.73)*** 
0.218  0.259  Government owns the company 
(1.51)   (2.54)** 
Manufacturing  -0.034  -0.281 
 (0.13)    (1.23) 
Service  -0.169  -0.356 
 (0.68)    (1.62) 
Agriculture  -0.156  -0.462 
 (0.64)    (1.89)* 
Construction  -0.138  -0.307 
 (0.54)    (1.40) 
Exporter  -0.120  -0.050 
 (2.59)***    (1.25) 
Size:  Medium  -0.133  -0.172 
 (2.13)**    (3.16)*** 
Size:  Large  -0.201  -0.281 
 (2.09)**    (3.25)*** 
-0.005  -0.002  Years since the company was established 
(5.16)***   (1.93)* 
Country variables      
Log(GDP)   -0.041  -0.041 
   (0.81)  (0.80) 
GDP growth (%)    0.020  0.031 
   (0.46)  (0.69) 
Labor regulations obstacle    0.017  0.060 
   (0.13)  (0.45) 
Inflation rate    0.000  0.000 
   (0.20)  (0.23) 
Effectiveness of the legislature     -0.306  -0.268 
   (2.41)**  (2.14)** 
 -0.086  -0.100  ICRG 
   (2.31)**  (2.54)** 
Chi Squared Firms  98.83    82.24 
  0.00  0.00 
Chi Squared Countries    26.08  23.30 
   0.00  0.00 
Observations 3567  3567  3567 
R
2 overall  0.03  0.07  0.09 
R
2  within  0.02 - 0.02 
R
2 between  0.02  0.07  0.07 
Dependent variable: % of sales off the books (1= none; 2= 1-10%; 3=11-20%; 4= 21-30%; 
5= 31-40; 6= 41-50%; 7=more than 50%).Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors 
adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 
percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Chi
2-test of joint significance and its corresponding p-
values are reported for each group of variables   21
Table 4 presents the coefficients using an ordered probit approach.
11 Similarly, Table 5 
presents the corresponding marginal coefficients for each of the seven categories of our 
dependent variable for our main variables of interest as well as for selected variables that yield 
statistically significant results. 
                                                           
11 The standard errors in all the regressions of this paper are corrected for clusters at the country level.  Additionally, 
the z-statistics presented are robust. Since we are controlling for country-level variables, we do not use fixed effects. 








Table 5. Country and Firm Determinants of Informality: Marginal Effects,  Selected Variables 
 
Dependent Variable:  percentage of sales off the books  
   Pr (Y=none)  Pr (Y=1-10%)  Pr (Y=11-20%) Pr (Y=21-30%) Pr (Y=31-40%) Pr (Y=41-50%) Pr (Y=more than 50%)
-0.276     -0.002    -0.012     -0.016     -0.013     -0.024     -0.041     Company owned by foreign 
investor  (3.73)  ***  (0.64)   (3.15)  ***  (3.45)  ***  (3.32)  ***  (3.36)  ***  (3.65)  *** 
0.259    0.003   0.012    0.015    0.013    0.022    0.038    Government owns company 
(2.54)  **  (0.73)   (1.95)  **  (2.24)  **  (2.38)  **  (2.39)  **  (3.02)  *** 
Service  -0.356    0.001   -0.013    -0.019    -0.017    -0.031    -0.059   
  (1.62)    (0.43)   (1.36)    (1.58)    (1.62)    (1.64)  *  (1.67)  * 
Agriculture  -0.462    -0.011   -0.025    -0.029    -0.022    -0.038    -0.058   
  (1.89)  *  (0.76)   (1.36)    (1.75)  *  (2.02)  **  (2.11)  **  (2.82)  *** 
Construction  -0.307    -0.004   -0.015    -0.018    -0.015    -0.026    -0.043   
  (1.40)    (0.50)   (1.06)    (1.29)    (1.41)    (1.47)    (1.77)  * 
Size: Medium  -0.172    0.001   -0.006    -0.009    -0.008    -0.015    -0.028   
  (3.16)  ***  (0.39)   (3.11)  ***  (2.98)  ***  (3.08)  ***  (2.61)  ***  (3.01)  *** 
Size: Large  -0.281    -0.002   -0.013    -0.016    -0.014    -0.024    -0.042   
  (3.25)  ***  (0.69)   (2.63)  ***  (2.74)  ***  (3.09)  ***  (2.68)  ***  (3.79)  *** 
-0.002    0.000   0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    Years since company was 
established  (1.93)  *  (0.52)   (1.83)  *  (1.95)  *  (1.96)  ***  (1.90)  *  (1.81)  * 
Effectiveness of legislature   -0.268    0.001   -0.010    -0.015    -0.013    -0.024    -0.045  
  (2.14)  **  (0.52)   (2.13)  **  (2.15)  **  (2.16)  **  (1.97)  **  (2.03)  ** 
ICRG -0.100    0.001 -0.004    -0.005    -0.005    -0.009    -0.017   
  (2.54)  **  (0.57)   (2.09)  **  (2.42)  **  (2.46)  **  (2.43)  **  (2.50)  ** 
Marginal effects for statistically significant variables, only. Robust z-statistics below coefficients. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) 
significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Marginal effects computed after regression on column 3 from Table 4.   23
 
The first column in Table 4 reports the results when using firm-specific variables 
only. Among these variables, foreign ownership, whether the firm is an exporter, firm 
size and age of the firm all tend to be statistically significant at conventional levels and 
are linked with a reduction in informality, when defined as sales off the books. We also 
include a Chi
 Squared test of joint significance of our firm variables, which allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that all firm-level variables are jointly equal to 0. Along the 
same lines, Column 2 in Table 4 includes country-level variables only. Both the 
effectiveness of the legislature and the ICRG index are the only ones that yield 
statistically significant coefficients at conventional levels. Despite this, the Chi-Squared 
test of joint significance for country-level variables does not reject the null hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the institutional variable yields the expected negative sign, which is 
consistent with Propositions 1 and 2 in our theoretical model. Notably, the R-Squared 
(0.07) between countries is considerably higher than the R-Squared within firms (0.02). 
The third column in Table 4 includes both firm-level and country-level variables. 
The results are very similar to the ones mentioned above. In particular, our variable of 
interest, institutional quality, is negative and statistically significant, too. As before, firm 
size also yields the expected sign and statistical significance. Again, the predictive power 
of the firm-level variables, as measured by the R-Squared within, is widely exceeded by 
the R-Squared between countries. While our results show that several firm-level 
characteristics can indeed explain the variation in informality, we find strong evidence 
that most of the variation appears to be driven by differences across countries in their 
respective levels of institutional quality, thus rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of 
what is implied by our theoretical model. In particular, our measures of institutional 
quality are robust and statistically significant in explaining informality. 
4.2. Robustness 
We carry out several robustness checks. In one type of robustness exercise, we employ 
alternative measures of institutional quality with subcomponents of the ICRG index, as 
well as with other governance indicators recently compiled by the World Bank (see 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005). This is shown in Table 6. 
   24
Table 6. Robustness to Institutional Measures 
 
 Institutions R-Squared 
     
OverallWithin Between 
ICRG sub indices        
Corruption  -0.215 0.110 0.025 0.087 
  (4.41)***      
Rule of law (ICRG)  -0.050 0.081 0.024 0.058 
  (0.72)     
Governance         
Political stability  -0.199 0.091 0.024 0.067 
  (2.66)***      
Government effectiveness   -0.193 0.086 0.024 0.063 
  (1.64)*      
Rule of law (WB)  -0.199 0.088 0.024 0.066 
  (1.86)*      
Control of corruption  -0.279 0.097 0.024 0.074 
   (2.80)***      
Dependent variable: % of sales off the books (1= none; 2= 1-10%; 3=11-20%; 
4= 21-30%; 5= 31-40; 6= 41-50%; 7=more than 50%). Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) 
significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 
percent. Results are based on the same ordered probit specification employed 
in column 3 from Table 4. ICRG variables are from ICRG (2006); 
Governance variables are from Kaufmann et al. (2005). 
 
Once again, the results clearly indicate that country-wide differences in 
institutional quality matter a good deal for individual firms’ degree of informality, more 
so than firm-specific characteristics. Again, this is reflected by the dramatic differences in 
the R-Squared between and R-Squared within.
12 
 
                                                           
12 For the sake of economy we only present the coefficients of our variables of interest as well as the R-
Squared between countries. Full results are available upon request.   25
Table 7. Country and Firm Determinants of Illegality 
 
 Illegality  Measure  R-Squared 
   Overall Within Between
Corruption Indices        
(i) % of contract value paid to government  -0.097 0.046  0.007  0.032 
  (2.25)**      
(ii) Frequency of payments to telephone authorities  -0.177 0.292  0.024 0.263
  (2.74)***      
(iii) Frequency of payments to licensing authorities  -0.141 0.248  0.019 0.227
  (2.67)***      
(iv) Frequency of payments to tax authorities  -0.165 0.355  0.004 0.356
  (1.92)*      
(v) Frequency of payments to gain government contracts  -0.131 0.224  0.020 0.189
  (1.88)*      
(vi) Frequency of payments to customs authorities   -0.171 0.287  0.016 0.274
  (3.00)***      
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) significant at 
10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Results are based on the same 
ordered probit specification employed in column 3 from Table 4. 
 
Additionally, and arguably more importantly, we employ alternative proxies for 
illegality rather than the extent of informality. Specifically, the WBES contains 
information on the frequency of bribery payments made to various agencies—typically 
government ones such as the licensing authority, telephone companies, tax authorities, 
and customs authorities—to secure service provision. Using the corresponding variables 
as proxies for illegality we re-run the basic regressions. The reported results include the 
coefficients of the ICRG variables and the between-within R-Squared. The former are 
significant and of the expected sign; and the between-within ratio of R-Squared is often 
even larger than before. For example, the values of the between R-Squared with respect 
to “the frequency of payment to tax authorities” as well as to “the frequency of payments 
to customs authority” range between 0.25-0.40, whereas the within R-Squared values are 
close to 0. This is shown in Table 7. 
 
4.3. Some Parts of the World are Flatter than Others 
While the above analysis appears to suggest that overall, countries’ institutions matter a 
great deal for firms’ behavior, it may be of interest to disentangle this finding by trying to   26
identify groups of countries where such institutions are relatively more important than in 
other countries.  
  
Table 8. Country and Firm Determinants of Informality  
and the Link between Institutions and GDP 
 
  percent of sales off the books  
Firm variables    
 -0.273  Company is own by a foreign investor 
 (3.78)*** 
 0.259  Government owns the company 
 (2.51)** 
Manufacturing   -0.470 
   (2.00)** 
Service   -0.551 
   (2.39)** 
Agriculture   -0.630 
   (2.43)** 
Construction   -0.476 
   (2.02)** 
Exporter   -0.049 
   (1.20) 
Size: Medium    -0.168 
   (3.19)*** 
Size: Large    -0.295 
   (3.54)*** 
 -0.002  Years since the company was established 
 (2.00)** 
Country variables     
Log(GDP) -0.278  -0.289 
 (2.31)**  (2.37)** 
GDP growth (%)  0.033  0.044 
 (0.81)  (1.07) 
Labor regulations obstacle  0.027  0.072 
 (0.25)  (0.64) 
Inflation rate  0.001  0.001 
 (0.45)  (0.47) 
Effectiveness of the legislature   -0.431  -0.396 
 (2.87)***  (2.72)*** 
ICRG -1.398  -1.455 
 (2.70)***  (2.81)*** 
GDP*ICRG 0.051  0.052 
 (2.48)**  (2.56)**   27
               Table 8., continued 
 
  percent of sales off the books  
Chi-Squared Firms    78.73 
   0.00 
Chi-Squared Countries  39.80  42.17 
 0.00  0.00 
Observations 3567  3567 
R2 overall  0.07  0.10 
R
2 within  -  0.02 
R
2 between  0.07  0.08 
Dependent variable: % of sales off the books (1= none; 2= 1-10%; 3=11-20%; 4= 21-
30%; 5= 31-40; 6= 41-50%; 7=more than 50%). Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) significant at 10 percent; (**) 
significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Chi
2-test of joint significance 




Hence, in Table 8 we include in our basic specification an interaction term of 
GDP with ICRG. This term turns out to be significant and positive—which implies that 
in high-income countries nation-wide institutions matter relatively less than in low-
income countries. As in the previous section, the robustness of these results is also tested 
using several institutional proxies as well as different measures of law compliance 
included in the WBES survey. The results are shown in Table 9 and Table 10. 
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Table 9. Robustness to Institutional Measures 
(Institutions*GDP) 
 




ICRG sub indices          
(i) Corruption   -3.102 0.112  0.112 0.015  0.091
  (2.14)** (1.97)**     
(ii) Rule of Law (ICRG)  -2.613 0.099  0.091  0.004  0.071 
  (3.77)*** (3.74)***    
Governance           
(iii) Political Stability  -1.801 0.062  0.092 0.021  0.068
  (1.45) (1.27)      
(iv) Government Effectiveness   -2.206 0.077  0.087 0.016  0.066
  (1.93)* (1.78)*     
(v) Rule of Law (WB)  -2.379 0.083  0.090 0.016  0.069
  (2.65)*** (2.47)**     
(vi) Control of Corruption  -2.725 0.093  0.100 0.013  0.079
   (3.42)*** (2.93)***    
Dependent variable: % of sales off the books (1= none; 2= 1-10%; 3=11-20%; 4= 21-30%; 
5= 31-40; 6= 41-50%; 7=more than 50%). Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors 
adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 
percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Results are based on the same ordered probit 
specification employed in column 2 from Table 8. ICRG variables are from ICRG (2006); 
Governance variables are from Kaufmann et al. (2005). 
 
Table 10. Robustness to Illegality Measures 
(Institutions*GDP) 
  
R-Squared   ICRG  Index ICRG*GDP 
Overall Within Between
Corruption Indices:         
(i) % contract value paid to government  -1.310 0.047  0.049 0.001 0.035
  (2.00)** (1.90)**       
(ii) Frequency of payments to telephone authorities  -3.539  0.131     0.312    0.004    0.284
  (3.18)*** (3.07)***      
(iii) Frequency of payments to licensing authorities  -2.667 0.098  0.269 0.002 0.249
  (3.15)*** (3.08)***      
(iv) Frequency of payments to tax authorities  -2.497 0.091  0.370 0.001 0.375
  (2.34)** (2.24)**       
(v) Frequency of payments to gain government contracts -3.973 0.150  0.242 0.001 0.211
  (4.83)*** (4.66)***      
(vi) Frequency of payments to custom authorities  -3.129 0.115  0.304 0.001 0.290
   (4.28)*** (4.11)***      
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) significant at 10 
percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Results are based on the same ordered probit 
specification employed in column 2 from Table 8.   29
Overall, we obtain findings very similar to the previous ones. Furthermore, the 
results suggest that there may exist a “convergence club” of richer countries across which 
firms’ behavior is alike, which is consistent with the influential thesis on income 
convergence across rich countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 1995).  
5. Concluding Remarks 
This research examines the recently popularized thesis that many economically relevant 
features of behavior have become similar across nations. The specific focus of this 
paper—compliance with legal rules—has been shown in previous works to be a 
significant element in determining economic growth. Our model studies the extent of 
illegality chosen by firms and shows how these choices depend on country-wide levels of 
legal enforcement. Among the implications of the model is its effect on the variation in 
illegality across the firms. 
Our empirical analysis employs information on various aspects of firm-level 
illegality across various countries with diverse institutional quality. We find that firm-
level characteristics, such as the nature of firm ownership and its size and age, matter for 
the extent of illegality chosen by the firm; however, the bulk of variation in illegality 
across the firms in our sample comes from country-wide measures of institutional quality. 
These results are robust to the specific measures of illegality and to the measures of 
institutional quality. We are thus confident in refuting the claim that “countries no longer 
matter.” We do, however, find some evidence that the importance of country-wide 
characteristics is reduced with their level of development, so that the extent of illegality 
in poorest countries is most susceptible to these characteristics. 
Several interesting questions remain beyond this paper’s reach. An important 
issue, which the available data cannot address, is the intertemporal change in the relative 
importance of country-wide characteristics. A related but different issue concerns the 
effects of openness on the role of cross-country variation in institutional quality in 
explaining the variance in illegality. Provided that differences across countries prevail in 
explaining illegality, a next step would be to more thoroughly examine the causes of 
these differences. While this paper emphasizes the differences in institutional quality 
across countries, Fisman and Miguel (2006) seem to favor the differences in social 
norms. Further work is needed to determine the relative importance of these factors.   30
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